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Takings Claims Against the Federal Government - In General
A.

The just compensation clause of the fifth amendment states ".. . nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
Const. amend. V.
1.

Eminent Domain
When the federal government condemns land to create a public
recreation area, it must pay the property owner "just compensation."
See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land. 441 U.S. 506 (1979).

2.

Inverse Condemnation
While a typical taking occurs when the government condemns property
under its power of eminent domain, the doctrine of "inverse
condemnation" is based on the proposition that a taking may occur
without the initiation of formal proceedings. First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County. 482 U.S. 304,
315 (1987). The Supreme Court has observed that the "self-executing
character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation"
entitles a landowner to bring an action in inverse condemnation when
government action works a taking of property rights. Id.

3.

Physical Takings
The Supreme Court has ruled that physical occupation of property, no
matter how small, effects a taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982). A permanent physical
occupation of property by the government is a taking without regard
to the public interests served. Id. at 426.

4.

Regulatory Takings
The Supreme Court in 1922 recognized that regulatory action may also
constitute a "taking" that requires just compensation. In Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), the Court stated "while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking."

5.

Jurisdiction
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims (formerly the Claims Court) in
Washington, D.C. has exclusive jurisdiction over takings claims against
the federal government for sums in excess of $10,000. Lesser claims
may be brought in either the U.S. Court of Federal Claims or federal
district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491(a).
In Keene Corp. v. United States. 113 S. Ct. 2035 (1993), the Supreme
Court held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1500, the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims may not exercise jurisdiction over an action if the plaintiff has
brought a claim in another court based on the same operative facts.
The government’s view is that Keene prohibits a plaintiff from bringing
a takings claim based on a permit denial in the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims while simultaneously challenging the Corps’ permit denial in
federal district court. The Federal Circuit is currently considering the
government’s theory in Loveladies Harbor v. United States.
If plaintiffs are unable to bring simultaneous actions, they may run
afoul of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims’s 6-year statute of
limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501. For example, in Creppel v. United
States. 30 Fed. Cl. 323 (1994), a number of landowners had brought an
action in 1977 in federal district court challenging the validity of a 1976
Corps order that scaled back a proposed land reclamation project. In
1984, the district court ordered that the original project should
proceed, but stayed the order until EPA could decide whether to
commence veto proceedings. In 1985, EPA decided to veto the
project, and the Agency’s veto was upheld by the district court in 1988.
In 1991, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging
a taking without just compensation stemming from the cancellation of
the original project. The Court of Federal Claims held that the Corps
order issued in 1976 was a final action, and thus the statute of
limitations on all claims arising from the order began to run in 1976.
The court noted, however, that "[h]ad plaintiffs filed suit in this court
earlier and had the suit been either suspended or dismissed, an
argument for section 1500 tolling might exist." Id.

B.

Overview of Supreme Court Tests for Regulatory Takings Claims
1.

Regulatory Takings Test
The Supreme Court has emphasized that there is no set formula for
determining when government action effects a taking. The Court has,
however, ruled that the regulation of property may effect a taking of
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property if the regulation either:
fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest, or
o
2.

denies an owner economically viable use of his land. See
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).

Categorical Rule
If government action denies a landowner all economically beneficial or
productive use of his property, a taking will be found unless the
claimant’s proposed use would constitute a nuisance under
"background principles" of state law. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893, 2899 (1992).

3.

Ad Hoc Factual Inquiry
In engaging in essentially ad hoc factual inquiries, the Court has
identified three factors of particular importance in determining
whether government action works a taking: (1) the character of the
government action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation; and (3)
the extent to which the action interferes with reasonable investmentbacked expectations. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York.
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
a.

Character of the Government Action
If the government’s action can be characterized as a physical
invasion of the property, a court will be more likely to find a
taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).

b.

Economic Impact of the Regulation as Applied
In deciding whether a regulation effects a taking, the Supreme
Court has considered the economic impact of a regulation by
comparing the value of the property before and after the
regulation’s interference with the property. See Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S. 470, 497
(1987). However, mere diminution in property value as a result
of government regulation does not amount to a compensable
taking. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York. 438 U.S.
104 (1978).
-3-

c.

Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations
In determining whether government regulation amounts to an
unconstitutional taking, courts will also consider the impact of
the action on the property owner’s reasonable investmentbacked expectations. See Penn Central. 438 U.S. at 124. In
Penn Central, the Supreme Court observed that because a New
York City landmark law did not interfere with current uses of
the parcel and allowed a reasonable return on the original
investment made in the property, the law did not interfere with
plaintiffs investment-backed expectations. Id. at 136. A
property owner challenging restrictions that the government
imposed after the owner acquired the property has a better
chance of bringing a successful takings claim. See, e.g., Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889 (1992)
(observing that plaintiff was not subject to beachfront
development restrictions at the time he acquired the property).

4.

Existence of Compensable Property Interest
Before a claimant may recover just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment, she must establish that, at the time of the alleged taking,
she held an interest in the property "taken" by the government. Lucas.
112 S. Ct. at 2899-900; Lacey v. United States. 595 F.2d 614, 619 (Ct.
Cl. 1979). In the absence of such an interest, a claimant cannot
proceed with a takings claim as to the "unowned" land. See, e.g.,
Plantation Landing Resort. Inc. v. United States. 30 Fed. Cl. 63 (1993)
(holding that no property interest existed where 50.5 acres of
claimant’s 59-acre project lay below the mean high water mark and
thus could only be owned by a private party if that party obtained a
reclamation permit from the State of Louisiana; claimant had obtained
such a permit but had allowed the permit to expire, which extinguished
the claimant’s compensable interest in the 50.5 acres); 1902 Atlantic
Ltd, v. United States. 26 Cl. Ct. 575 (1992) (holding that significant
revenue losses suffered by plaintiff during Section 404 permit review
process were not compensable as a temporary taking; the plaintiff was
never entitled to a section 404 permit and thus its economic interest
in obtaining the permit was not a compensable property interest).

-4-

II.

Takings Claims Against the Federal Government Arising in the Context of the
Federal Wetlands Regulatory Program_________________ _____________________
A.

Overview Of Wetlands Takings Claims
By far the most developed case law concerning federal regulatory takings has
arisen in the context of federal wetlands regulation under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. Many of the issues considered by the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims in the wetlands context are relevant to possible
takings claims based on other federal environmental and land use regulations.

B.

1.

In deciding whether the denial of a Section 404 permit gives rise to a
compensable taking, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims has generally
focused on the second prong of the Supreme Court’s taking test;
namely, whether the denial of a Section 404 permit denies
economically viable use of the property.

2.

The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has recognized that the requirement
that a property owner obtain a Section 404 permit before filling
wetlands advances legitimate government interests and promotes the
public welfare. See, e.g., Deltona Corp. v. United States. 657 F.2d
1184, 1192 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert. denied. 455 U.S. 1017 (1982);
Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. United States. 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388 (1988)
(Loveladies Harbor I). Accordingly, a challenge based on the assertion
that the Section 404 regulations do not advance legitimate state
interests is unlikely to succeed.

Application of Ad Hoc Factual Inquiry
1.

Character of the Government Action
In Loveladies Harbor I, 15 Cl. Ct. at 391, the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims observed that the denial of plaintiff's Section 404 permit was
not equivalent to a "physical destruction or intrusion attendant with an
act of eminent domain." Nonetheless, where the government draws a
line in time, prohibiting activity that had formerly been allowed, a
taking may be found if the government is attempting to achieve a
general public goal at the expense of an individual landowner. Florida
Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. at 168-69; Bowles v. United
States. 1994 WL 102117, *15n. 14. (Fed. Cl. March 24, 1994).

2.

Economic Impact of the Regulation as Applied
The fact that a Section 404 permit is denied, without more, does not
-5-

effect an unconstitutional taking. United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 128 (1985); See Loveladies Harbor I, 15 Cl. Ct.
at 391. To determine economic impact, the Court of Federal Claims
will compare the fair market value of the property before and after
permit denial. Bowles v. United States. 1994 WL 102117, *6 (Fed. Cl.
March 24, 1994).
a.

Mere Diminution in Value Is Not Compensable
In Deltona Corp. v. United States. 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (Ct. Cl.
1981), the Court of Claims ruled that mere diminution in value
as a result of the government’s denial of the highest and best
use of property does not, by itself, establish a taking.

b.

Must Show Loss of Economically Viable Use
The denial of a Section 404 permit may effect a taking of
property if the effect of the denial is to prevent economically
viable use of the land in question. See United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes. Inc.. 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Bowles v.
United States. No. 303-88L, 1994 WL 102117, at *10-11 (Fed.
Cl. Mar. 24, 1994); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States. No.
91-5156,1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4401 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10,1994);
Formanek v. United States. 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (Formanek
II); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States. 21 Cl. Ct. 153
(1990) (Loveladies Harbor II).
(1)

Developable Uplands
The existence of developable uplands within the
wetlands parcel may provide sufficient value to defeat a
takings claim. See Deltona Corp., 657 F.2d at 1192
(ruling that the denial of a Section 404 permit does not
effect a taking where property contains uplands that
could be developed without a Corps permit). In Jentgen
v. United States. 657 F.2d 1210,1213 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert.
denied. 455 U.S. 1017 (1982), the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims ruled that the denial of a Section 404 permit did
not amount to a taking where the Corps offered a
permit to allow the development of more than 20 acres
of the 80 acres covered by the permit and the tract
contained an additional 20 acres of developable upland
not subject to Corps permitting requirements.
-6-

The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has, however,
awarded compensation for a taking based on a permit
denial despite the presence of upland areas where the
upland property is surrounded by wetlands and cannot
be accessed without a Corps permit. Loveladies Harbor
II, 21 Cl. Q . at 159; Formanek II. 26 Cl. Ct. 332.
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has held, however,
that the mere presence of uplands, without a showing
that a market exists for proposed uses of the uplands,
fails to defeat a takings claim. Formanek II. 26 Cl. Ct.
332.
(2)

Recreational and Conservation Uses
In Loveladies Harbor II. 21 Cl. Ct. at 158-59, the
government unsuccessfully argued that sufficient
economically viable uses remained in the property
subject to a permit denial because the property could be
used for hunting, bird watching, agriculture,
conservation, a marina, or as a mitigation site for other
developers. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims rejected
these arguments because the government failed to show
that the proposed uses were reasonably probable or that
a market existed for such uses.

(3)

Offers to Purchase
The existence of a market in which a property owner
could have obtained value for its property may be
sufficient to defeat a takings claim. "The market from
which a fair market value may be ascertained need not
contain only legally trained (or advised) persons who
fully investigate current land use regulations; ignorance
of the law is every buyer’s right." Florida Rock Indus. v.
United States. No. 91-5156,1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4401,
at *15 n.12 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 1994).
An offer by a conservation group to purchase the
property at a fraction of the property’s value before the
permit denial does not demonstrate an "economically
viable use" sufficient to prevent a court from finding that
the permit denial effected a taking. Formanek v. United
States. 18 Cl. Ct. 785 (1989) (Formanek I).
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3.

Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations
In Ciampitti v. United States. 22 CL Ct. 310, 321 (1991) (Ciampitti II).
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the denial of a Section 404
permit did not effect a taking where the plaintiff purchased the
property in 1983, had knowledge of the restrictions applicable to the
property, and agreed to purchase restricted wetlands as part of a
package deal that included developable uplands. Because the plaintiff
had ample warning of the likelihood that the wetlands could not be
developed, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the permit
denial did not interfere with the plaintiff's reasonable investmentbacked expectations.
In Deltona Corp., 657 F.2d at 1193, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
acknowledged that the stiffening of Corps requirements that resulted
in a denial of a Section 404 permit "substantially frustrated" plaintiff's
reasonable investment-backed expectations. However, the denial did
not effect a taking because economically viable uses remained for the
property. Moreover, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims observed that
it was "‘quite simply untenable’" that property owners may establish a
taking simply by demonstrating that "‘they have been denied the ability
to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was
available for development.’" Id. (quoting Penn Central. 438 U.S. at
130). But see Nollan. 483 U.S. at 841 n.2 (observing that building on
one’s own land is a right, not a governmental benefit).

C.

Ripeness
1.

Submission of a Permit Application
In Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League. Inc. v. Marsh. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1983), the court ruled that a takings claim made before plaintiff
complied with Corps permit procedures was premature. See also
United States v. Byrd. 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979) (ruling that
plaintiff could not assert a takings claim until after applying for a
Section 404 permit because of the possibility that the Corps might issue
a permit); Riverside Bayview Homes. 474 U.S. at 127 (stating that
"[o]nly when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to
prevent ‘economically viable’ use of the land in question can it be said
that a taking has occurred").

2.

Final Decision
In Loveladies Harbor I. 15 Cl. Ct. at 386, the U.S. Court of Federal
-8-

Claims rejected arguments by the government that plaintiff's inverse
condemnation claim was not ripe for review after the denial of a single
Section 404 permit application. The court distinguished Supreme
Court rulings that had dismissed takings claims as unripe because there
had been no final determination by the government as to the number
of dwelling units that would be allowed. The court observed that the
Corps’ permit denial was based on environmental concerns and that
any development on the property would have similar environmental
impacts, demonstrating that development on the property was
unacceptable per se. Moreover, the court noted that the Corps failed
to provide any alternative development options. Accordingly, the case
was ripe for judicial review.
In Beure’-Co. v. United States. 16 Cl. Ct. 42 (1988), the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims also ruled that the Corps’ denial of a Section 404
permit was a final decision because the denial, based on ecological
concerns, could be read as an intention to deny any future 404
applications for discharges onto the subject property. The court noted
that the Corps did not suggest any modifications or appropriate or
practical mitigation measures that would have allowed development of
the property. See also Formanek I. 18 Cl. Ct. at 793 (holding
plaintiff’s taking claim ripe for review where the Corps’ decision to
deny a permit could be read as foreclosing development on any part
of the wetlands complex).
3.

Requirement to Seek a Variance Inapplicable
In Beure’-Co., 16 Cl. Ct. at 49, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
rejected arguments by the government that plaintiffs inverse
condemnation claim was not ripe because he had not sought a
"variance" from the Corps’ denial. The court found no procedures in
Corps regulations that would allow a property owner to seek a variance
or analogous relief from a permit denial.

4.

Denial of Necessary State Approvals Does Not Bar Federal Claim
In Ciampitti v. United States. 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 552-53 (1989) (Ciampitti
I), the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that New Jersey’s denial of
a Coastal Zone Management Plan consistency determination, a
prerequisite to the granting of a Section 404 permit, did not render
plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim premature. The court observed
that the Corps’ permit denial was based on grounds independent of the
State’s denial of a consistency determination. The court stated that a
plain reading of the Corps’ decision to deny the permit application
-9-

indicated that the Corps would have denied the permit regardless of
the State’s action. The court also ruled that the plaintiff's failure to
even apply for necessary state water quality certification did not render
the claim premature.
D.

The "Parcel as a Whole"
In determining the economic impact of the government action, the court will
consider the impact on the "parcel as a whole." Penn Central. 438 U.S. at
115. Thus, if an owner has been denied economic use of part of a parcel but
retains economic use of other parts of the parcel, a court will not find a
taking. This rule is in flux. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 112
S.Ct. 2886 (1992). Florida Rock Industries v. United States. 1994 WL 83987
(Fed. Cir., March 10, 1994).
1.

Property Sold Before the Time of the Taking Excluded
In Loveladies Harbor I. 15 Cl. Ct. at 392, the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims excluded from the parcel as a whole property that was part of
plaintiff's original purchase but that had been sold by the time of the
alleged taking. See also Formanek II. 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (excluding from
consideration portions of the property sold before the date of the
Corps’ permit denial).

2.

Noncontiguous Property Generally Excluded
In Penn Central. 438 U.S. at 115, 130-31, the Supreme Court defined
the "parcel" as including only the property that was subject to the
landmark designation. The court noted that plaintiff owned numerous
other properties throughout Manhattan but did not include those
noncontiguous properties in the property against which the
government’s action was measured.
Citing Penn Central, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in Loveladies
Harbor I. 15 Cl. Ct. at 392, excluded parcels that were part of the
plaintiffs original purchase but were no longer contiguous to the
property allegedly taken by the government and were not affected by
the Corps’ permit denial.
However, in Ciampitti v. United States. 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991)
(Ciampitti II). the U.S. Court of Federal Claims included
noncontiguous property held by the plaintiff in the "parcel as a whole."
The court expressed some concern about the lack of contiguity but
noted that the plaintiff had viewed both portions as a single parcel for
-10-

purposes of purchase and financing. The court also stated that at the
time the plaintiff was negotiating for the acquisition of the property,
he retained ownership of lots that linked the two portions.
3.

Legally Undevelopable Property Excluded
In Loveladies Harbor I. 15 Cl. Ct. at 393, the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims excluded from the parcel as a whole a portion of contiguous
property that could not be developed because the State of New Jersey
had previously denied necessary development permits for that portion
of the property.
In Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 904-05 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (Florida Rock II), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), the
court considered the parcel to consist of only the 98 acres subject to
plaintiff's permit application (which the Corps denied) rather than the
entire 1,560-acre wetland tract owned by plaintiff. In this case, the
Corps limited the area of the permit application to 98 acres--the
amount of land that could be mined in the three-year period (the
normal duration of Corps permits). The court declined to speculate
on the outcome of future permit applications. Presumably, the plaintiff
would have been required to apply for 15 98-acre permits, ripening 15
successive takings claims in order to obtain just compensation for the
entire parcel. This result was rejected by subsequent Supreme Court
decisions.

4.

Developable Uplands Included
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has consistently included upland
portions of the property (i.e., portions of the property that are not
subject to Corps regulation) in the "parcel as a whole."
In Deltona Corp. v. United States. 657 F.2d at 1192, the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims held that the denial of a Corps permit did not effect
a taking because plaintiff retained 111 acres of upland that could be
developed without a Corps permit. See also Jentgen v. United States.
657 F.2d at 1213 (Cl. Ct. 1981) (the existence of developable uplands
provided economically viable uses sufficient to defeat a takings claim).
In Ciampitti II. 22 Cl. Ct. at 318, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
included noncontiguous upland portions of plaintiffs property that
were part of plaintiffs original purchase, stating that ”[i]n the case of
a landowner who owns both wetlands and adjacent uplands, it would
clearly be unrealistic to focus exclusively on the wetlands, and ignore
-11-

whatever rights remain in the uplands."
In Loveladies Harbor II. 21 Cl. Ct. at 159, the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims considered the value of one acre of upland owned by plaintiff
that was surrounded by wetland. The court concluded, however, that
the upland did not provide sufficient value to defeat a takings claim
because a denial of a permit to fill surrounding wetlands had
effectively precluded development of the upland as well.
In Formanek II. 26 Cl. Ct. 332, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled
that the presence of 12 acres of upland on a 112-acre tract was not
sufficient to defeat a takings claims. The court noted that a fill permit
would be required to access the upland portions of the property and
that the government failed to demonstrate that a market existed for
proposed uses of the uplands.
E.

Temporary Takings
1.

The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has ruled that a sixteen-month delay
in the processing of a Section 404 permit by the Corps (during which
time the value of the property dropped) did not amount to an
"extraordinary delay" and thus did not give rise to a temporary takings
claim. Dufau v. United States. 32 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1524 (Cl. Ct.
1990).

2.

In 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. United States. 26 Cl. Ct. 575 (1992), a property
owner alleged a temporary taking based on the Corps’ initial denial of
a Section 404 permit. The property owner first challenged the Corps’
permit denial in federal district court, and the court ordered the Corps
to either reconsider the permit denial or institute condemnation
proceedings. The Corps denied the permit a second time and only
after a further court order did it issue a Section 404 permit. The
property owner filed suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims seeking
compensation for the five-year delay in the project caused by the
Corps’ permit denials. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that
the conduct of the Corps did not effect a temporary taking because
plaintiff did not have a property right to the fill permit during the time
in question, nor did the administrative review process amount to
"extraordinary delay." Ld. at 578.

3.

In Tabb Lakes. Inc, v. United States. 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992), aff' d sub
nom. Tabb Lakes. Ltd. v. United States. 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
plaintiffs brought a temporary takings claim based on the economic
impact of a Corps cease-and-desist order. Plaintiffs had previously and
-12-

successfully challenged in federal court the Corps’ basis for exercising
jurisdiction over the area in question. Tabb Lakes. Ltd. v. United
States. 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988) (ruling that the Corps could
not exercise jurisdiction over the site based on the "migratory bird rule"
because the Corps had not adopted the rule in accordance with the
formal rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act),
aff'd. 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989). In the later case, the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims ruled that plaintiffs were not entitled to
compensation for the three-year period during which the Corps
asserted jurisdiction over the property because plaintiffs were able to
sell upland lots during this time and were thus not deprived of all
economically viable use of their property. Tabb Lakes. 26 Cl. Ct. at
1352.
F.

The Nuisance Exception
If the claimant’s proposed use of its property would amount to a nuisance, just
compensation is not required even if the government’s action precludes all
use; this is so because plaintiff can have no property interest in carrying out
a nuisance. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S.Ct. at 2899. The
government has the burden of establishing that the proposed use would
constitute a nuisance. Bowles v. United States. 1994 W L 102117, *6 (Fed. Cl.,
March 24, 1994).
1.

Discharge of Dredged or Fill Material Not a Nuisance
In Florida Rock Indus. v. United States. 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 166-67 (1990)
(Florida Rock III), vacated and remanded on other grounds. No. 915156, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4401 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 1994), the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims ruled that plaintiff’s proposed limestone
mining in wetlands did not constitute a public nuisance because the
activity did not significantly increase the risk of contaminating area
aquifers. The court also noted that there were many limestone
quarries in the vicinity of plaintiff’s property. The court observed that
"the assertion that a proposed activity would be a nuisance merely
because Congress chose to restrict, regulate, or prohibit it for the
public benefit indicates circular reasoning that would yield the
destruction of the fifth amendment." Id. at 168.
In Loveladies Harbor II. 21 Cl. Ct. at 154 n.3, the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims recognized that the plaintiffs proposed filling of
wetlands for residential development would not constitute a nuisance.
In doing so, the court noted that the State of New Jersey had granted
state water quality certification and that it is the State’s function to
-13-

regulate land use. The court deferred to the State’s findings
concerning pollution arising from the activity. Id.
2.

Wetlands Development as Equivalent to a Nuisance
A few state courts have ruled that the development of wetlands
amounts to a public harm that can be prohibited under the
government’s police powers without giving rise to an unconstitutional
taking. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972)
(ruling that a county ordinance prohibiting the filling of wetlands
prevented a public harm that would arise from the alteration of the
natural character of the wetland property and therefore did not effect
a taking); Orion Corp. v. Washington State. 747 P.2d 1062, 1081
(Wash. 1987), cert. denied. 486 U.S. 1022 (1988) (ruling that state and
local regulation of tidelands did not give rise to a taking, stating "no
compensable taking can occur as long as regulations substantially serve
the legitimate public purpose of prohibiting uses of property injurious
to the public interest in health, the environment, or the fiscal integrity
of the community"). The Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), will make it more
difficult for the government to raise the nuisance defense to takings
claims.

G.

Damage Award
1.

Just Compensation
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has recognized that the proper
measure of just compensation for the taking of property is the fair
market value of the property at the time of the taking. See Loveladies
Harbor II. 21 Cl. Ct. at 160 (awarding $2,658,000 plus interest for the
taking of 12.5 acres of land). Successful plaintiffs should also receive
interest on that amount from the time of the taking. Id.; see also
Bowles v. United States. No. 303-88L, 1994 WL 102117, at *15 (Fed.
Cl. Mar. 24, 1994) (compound interest awarded to private landowner
for taking of residential property); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United
States, 1994 WL 45855 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 10, 1994) (finding taking of
commercial property and awarding compound interest to compensate
for significant delay).
In determining the fair market value of property taken as a result of
the Corps’ denial of a Section 404 application, the property is to be
valued without regard to the Section 404 restrictions that gave rise to
the takings claim. See Loveladies Harbor II, 21 Cl. Ct. at 156.
-14-

.

2

Attorneys’ Fees
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has ruled that successful plaintiffs
in an inverse condemnation suit against the United States based on a
denial of a Section 404 permit are entitled to an award of attorneys’
fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 4654. See, e.g., Bowles. No. 303-88L,
1994 WL 102117, at *15; Loveladies Harbor II. 21 Cl. Ct. at 161.
The United States government agreed to pay $100,000 in litigation
expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4654 as part of a settlement of a
takings claim arising from a Section 404 permit denial. Beure’-Co. v.
United States, No. 129-86L (Judgment) (Cl. Ct. Dec. 16, 1991).
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PLAGER,

Circuit Judge.

This case first came before the court as a regulatory takings
case.

The United States Government (Government) appealed from the

merits of a decision of the Court of Federal Claims,
granted monetary relief to a property owner,
Inc.

and

Loveladies

Loveladies),

as

Harbor,

a consequence of

wetlands development permit.
by this court
dismiss

for

of

dispute

D,

Loveladies Harbor,

Inc.

(collectively,

the Government's

denial

of a

In light of an intervening decision

on an unrelated matter,

lack

jurisdictional

Unit

which had

jurisdiction.

the Government moved to
The

court

has

inbanc.

taken
We

the
hold

J
* udge Archer assumed the position of Chief Judge on March
18, 1994.

that

UNR, but prior to

Based on our decision in

UNR/Keene, hte Government moved in t

Supreme Court in

vacate the judgment in favor of Loveladies.
motion argued that

The Government in its

UNR compelled the conclusion that, since the

suit in the Court of Federal Claims had been filed while the appeal
in the earlier district court suit was still pending, § 1500 bars
the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims over the cause.
In opposition to the Government's motion,
that

Loveladies argued

UNR did not compel that conclusion for several reasons,

including that the same claims were not involved and that

United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956) and like cases, distinguishing
claims on the basis of the relief sought, supported jurisdiction.
Because of the importance of the issue,

and the fact that

other pending cases raise the same issue,8 this court, sitting

in

banc, by order dated September 28, 1993, called for briefs and
subsequently heard oral argument regarding the jurisdiction of the
Court of Federal Claims, and by derivation the jurisdiction of this
court,

over

this

matter.

After

considering

the

briefs

and

Without
suggesting any view of the merits of the
Government's claim in any particular case, we note that similar
motions have been filed by the Government in a number of other
cases now before the Court of Federal Claims. See, e.g., Rybachek.
v
United States, No. 379-89L;
WhitneyBenefits
83C; and Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma
United States, No. 24287L; State of Utah
v.United States, No. 91-1428L; State of Al
States, No. 92-314L. In addition, the Court of Federal Claims has
granted a number of such motions, which are now before this court
on appeal.
See Southern Ute Indian Tribe
United States, No. 93-5019;
Dico, Inc.
v.United States, No. 93-5124; Cascade Development Co., Inc
United States, No. 83-5087.
91-5050
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arguments

of

the

parties,

and

those

of the

several

,
i
c
m
a9 we

conclude that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over the
cause, and the appeal on the merits of that court's decision is
properly before this court.

The Government's motion to dismiss is

denied.

DISCUSSION

I.
As a preliminary matter, we observe that our decision in
does not constrain our decision today.

Appellants in

UNR, asbestos

manufacturers, filed suit against the United States in the district
court seeking money damages based on tort claims.

They then filed

in the Court of Federal Claims for money damages based on certain
contracts they had with the Government.
the

same

underlying

events.

Both suits arose out of

Appellants

challenged

the

long

standing rule that suits involving the same operative facts and
seeking the same relief were the same "claims"
§ 1500,

even

for purposes of

British

if based on different legal theories.

American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 89 Ct. cl. 438 (1939)

(

American) .
Appellants

in

UNR

raised

another

issue.

Appellants'

contractual claims had been filed, but not acted upon, when their
district court claims were dismissed.

Thus, when the Government

Briefs amicus curiae were filed by: Cascade Development
Company; Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma; Dico, Inc.; National
Association of Home Builders; Pacific Legal Foundation; Southern
Ute Indian Tribe; the States of Utah and Alaska; and Whitney
Benefits, Inc.
91-5050
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moved

to dismiss

their

claims

in the

Court

of

Federal

pursuant to § 1500, appellants had no pending claims.

Claims

Appellants

hence argued that jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims was
barred only if a claim was pending when the Government moved to
dismiss

under

§

1500.

U N R ,this

In

appellants' contentions.
The

Supreme

Court

on

certiorari agreed.

Supreme Court held that

§ 1500 precluded the

Claims

jurisdiction

from

exercising

contract-based
manufacturers'

claims

against

the

over

United

UNR/Keene, the

In

Court of Federal

the

manufacturers'

States,

because

the

tort claims were still pending in district court

when suit in the Court of Federal Claims was filed.

The question

of whether another claim is "pending" for purposes of § 1500 is
determined at the time at which the suit in the Court of Federal
Claims is filed,

not the time at which the Government moves to

dismiss the action.
When

this

court

U
N
R
,w
e

decided

jurisprudence encumbering this statute."

Id., 962 F.2d at 1021.

In so doing, we declared "overruled" a n u m b e r of cases, including

Casman.

UNR, 692 F.2d at 1022

exception to our efforts.

n.3.

The

Supreme

Court

"Because the issue is not presented on

the facts of this case, we need not decide whether two actions
based on the same operative facts, but seeking completely different

UNR/Keene, 113 S. Ct. at 2043 n.6

relief, would implicate § 1500."
(citing

Casaan and a similar case, Boston Five Cents Savings

United States, 864 F.2d 137 (Fed. cir. 1988)
91-5050
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, FSB v.
.

At a

later point in its

UNR/Keene opinion the Supreme Court said: "In

applying § 1500 to the facts of this case, we find it unnecessary
to

consider,

exceptions'

Five."

much

to

less

§ 1500

repudiate,

the

'judicially

created

Tecon Engineers, Casman, and Boston

found in

UNR/Keene, 113 S. Ct. at 2044 (quoting from and citing to

this court's

UNR opinion.)10

As the Supreme Court has reminded us, anything we said in

UNR

regarding the legal import of cases whose factual bases were not
properly before us was mere
accord it

stare decisis effect.

dictum,

and therefore we will

not

The Government can draw no comfort

in this case from the holding of

UNR, as affirmed in UNR/Keene. The

issue the Government raises, and which is now properly before us
on the facts of this case, is whether § 1500 denies jurisdiction
to the Court of Federal Claims if, at the time a complaint for
money damages is filed, there is a pending action in another court
that seeks distinctly different relief.
cases like it, tells us the answer is no.
give

Our precedent,

Casman and

As we are unwilling to

stare decisis effect to a matter that we did not fully consider

and that was not before us in the prior case, we do not consider
today's case as a 'resurrection' of

Casman (see dissent, 57

op. at

5) , but as an opportunity for the Government to persuade us why we
should abandon

'

Tecon

Casman.

Eng'rs,Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 943

1965) held that a later-filed action in another court does not oust
the Court of Claims of jurisdiction over an earlier-filed
complaint.
That situation was not before this court in UNR.
91-5050
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II.

The precise issue in this case is the meaning of the term
"claims" as it is used in § 1500, which states that the Court of

claims for or in

Federal Claims shall not have jurisdiction "of

respect to which the plaintiff . . . has pending in any other court
any suit or process against the United States
added.)

. . ."

(Emphasis

Specifically, the question is whether the "claims" which

Loveladies brought to the Court of Federal Claims are the same as
the "claims" which Loveladies had already sued upon in the district
court.

If the claims are the same, the jurisdiction of the Court

of Federal Claims over the same claims, still pending before the
district

court when

the

second

suit was

filed,

§ 1500.

If the claims are distinctly different,

was

barred by

Loveladies are

excused from the jurisdictional dance required by § 1500.
Deciding if the claims are the same or distinctly different
"requires a comparison between the claims raised in the Court of
Federal Claims and in the other lawsuit."
2041.

113 S. Ct. at

It also requires a definition of "claims" that the statute

does not provide.

As the Supreme Court put it, "The exact nature

of the things to be compared is not illuminated, however, by the
awkward formulation of § 1500.".
d
I
The legislative history of § 1500 is fairly straightforward,
and was ably recounted in this court's opinion in
1017-19,
S.

962 F.2d at

and more briefly by the Supreme Court in UNR/Keene,

ct. 2039-40.

113

See also David Schwartz, Section 1500 of the Judicial

Code and Duplicate Suits Against the Government and Its Agents, 55 Geo. L.J.
91-5050
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573, 574-80 (1967).

Like the statute, the legislative history does

not teach how to identify claims that are the same for the purposes
of § 1500.
The meaning and scope of the term,
caselaw development.

then,

has been left to

This court recently reviewed the question in

Johns-Manville Corp.

v.United

States, 855 F.2d 1556 (Fed.

cert, denied, 489 U.s. 1066 (1989).)elivnaM-hoJ(

We rea

rule that it is 'operative facts' and not legal theories by which
claims may be distinguished under § 1500 when the same relief —
money damages —

is sought.11 Johns-Manville filed indemnification

claims in district courts against the Government, based on amounts
it had paid

for defense

and settlement

of

suits

for

injuries

allegedly due to exposure to asbestos products it had sold to the
Government.12

Jurisdiction in the district court was based on the

Federal Tort Claims Act.

While these suits were pending, Johns-

Manville filed three suits in the Court of Federal Claims seeking
indemnification

from

the

Government

for

essentially

the

same

losses, but this time on claims of breach of implied warranty, duty
to reveal superior knowledge, and mutual mistake —

all contract

based claims.
The

Court

of

pursuant to § 1500.

11

Federal

Claims

dismissed

plaintiff's

suit

We affirmed, holding that "Claims are the same

See also UNR, 962 F.2d at 1024, "We decline to disturb

either this precedent or Johns-Manville." "This precedent" referred
to British Aaerican and Los Angeles Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. United
States, 152 F. Supp. 236 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
12
There were also third-party complaints filed in the
Eastern District of Virginia. Johns-Manville, 855 F.2d at 1558.
91-5050
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where

they

arise

from

the

same

operative

facts

even

if

the

operative facts support different legal theories which cannot all

Johns-M anvil
l
e
855
,

be brought in one court."
court distinguished the situation before

it,

one

in which

the

relief sought from both courts is money but under different legal
theories, from one in which "a different type of relief is sought
in the district court (equitable) from that sought in the Court of
Claims

Id. at

(money)."

1566

(citing Casman).

observed, "the legislative history and the cases indicate section
1500 was enacted for the benefit of the government and was intended
to force an election where both forums could grant the same relief,
arising from the same operative facts."

Johns-Manville, 855 F.2d at

1564.
Viewing claims as related to the nature of the relief sought
is unremarkable.13

And using differing relief as a characteristic

for distinguishing claims was especially appropriate here, because
the Court of Federal Claims and its predecessors have been courts
with limited authority to grant relief.

These courts could not

grant the kinds of general equitable relief the district courts
could, even in cases over which they otherwise have had subjectmatter jurisdiction.
Claims

have

been

Although the powers of the Court of Federal

increased

in

recent

years,

so

that

in

some

instances it can grant complete relief in cases over which it has

"What is a claim against the United States is well
understood. It is a right to demand money from the United States."
Hobbs
v.
M
c
l
e
a
n, 117 u.S. 567, 575 (1885).
See also Blacks's Law
Dictionary 247 (6th ed. 1990), defining claim as, inter alia, a
" [d]emand for money or property as of right."
91-5050
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subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of Federal Claims remains
a court with limited remedial powers.14
Casaancase cited in

The

Johns-Manville arose when a governm

employee sued in district court for reinstatement to his position
with the Government, and while that suit was pending, sued in the
Court

of

Claims

for

back

pay

denied

him

as

a

result

of the

allegedly unlawful removal.15 When the Government moved to dismiss
under § 1500 the monetary claim in the Court of Claims, that court
denied the motion.

The court held that the two suits alleged

different "claims" —

although the two suits involved the same

conflict between the same parties, the claims were distinguished
by the different form of relief each sought.16
This court and its predecessor, although sometimes referring
to the

Casaan rule as an "exception" to § 1500, see, e.g., Johns-

Manville at 1566,
distinguish claims.

have

consistently

See, e.g.

applied

this

principle

to

TruckeeCarson

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992) (granting
Court of Federal Claims power to render judgment in nonmonetary
disputes arising under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978).
15
Under the jurisdictional rules then in effect, the
district court could not grant the monetary damages alleged, and
the Court of Claims did not have authority to order reinstatement.
Now, under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992), the Court of
Federal Claims can order reinstatement.
16
"The claim in this case and the relief sought in the
district court are entirely different. The claim of plaintiff for
back pay is one that falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of
this court, and there is no other court which plaintiff might
elect.
On the other hand, the Court of Claims is without
jurisdiction to restore plaintiff to his position." Casaan, 135
Ct. Cl. at 649-50 (citations omitted).
The suit in the Court of
Claims was allowed to continue.
91-5050
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States, 223 ct. Cl. 684 (1980); Boston Five, 864 F.2d 137 (Fed. cir.
See also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl.

1988).
1981)

(takings claim was filed and prosecuted in Court of Claims

during

the

pendency

of

validity of the Corps'
issue

of

whether

addressed);

a

challenge

to

the

denial of a dredge and fill permit;

the

jurisdiction

was

in

district

barred

by

§

court

1500

was

not

Webb v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 650 (1990) (relief used

to distinguish a claim presented to the then Claims Court from a
claim in district court).
The description of the
is inapt.

Casaan rule as an "exception" to § 1500

Courts cannot create exceptions to jurisdictional grants

not expressed in the statute.
U.S.

537

(1924).

Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263

Casaan and its progeny reflect a carefully

considered interpretation of the statutory term "claims," a term
undefined in the statute and subject to conflicting views as to its
meaning.
Similarly, the "operative facts" rule applied in
was an interpretation of the term "claims," and was consistent with
the Court of Claims decision in

British American, which had held that

two claims were not necessarily different simply because they were
based

on

different

legal

theories.

In

British American, the

plaintiff, acting under federal regulations and executive orders,
surrendered gold bullion to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The plaintiff brought suit against the Government in district court
under a tort theory, and in the Court of Claims under a contractual
theory.
91-5050

In both courts plaintiff sought a money judgment.
12

The

Court of Claims held that § 1500 barred the claim before it.

It

made no difference that the two suits were based upon different
legal theories; the plaintiff had only one claim for money based
on the same set of facts.
Courts

have

also

American.17

long

followed

See e.g.

152 F. Supp. 236 (Ct. Cl. 1957);

F .2d

1992);

principle

of

British

Los Angeles Shipbuilding Drydock
&
Corp. v
Hill v. United States, 8 Cl. ct. 382

Bennally v. United States,14 Cl. ct. 8 (1987);,elivnaMshoJ

(1985);
855

the

1556

(Fed.

Cir.

UNR, 962 F.2d 1013

1988);

(Fed.

Cir.

UNR/Keene, 113 S. Ct. 2035, 2043 (1993) ("The decision in

British American Tobacco strikes us, moreover, as a sensible reading
of the statute . . .").
Thus
principle

American.

we

have

consistently

established

in

tested

claims

against

both

the

Casman and that established in British

Taken together, these tests produce a working definition

of "claims" for the purpose of applying § 1500.

For the Court of

Federal Claims to be precluded from hearing a claim under § 1500,
the claim pending in another court must arise from

the same operative

facts, and must seek the same relief. We know of no case arising from
the same operative

facts

in which § 1500 has been held to bar

Despite
7
1
its lineage, it can be argued that there is a
basic epistemological difficulty with the notion of legally
operative facts independent of a legal theory.
Insofar as a fact
is 'operative' — i.e., relevant to a judicially imposed remedy - it is necessarily associated with an underlying legal theory,
that is, the cause of action.
For example, without legal
underpinning, words in a contract are no different from casual
correspondence. Because it is unnecessary for our decision in this
case, we need not further refine the meaning of 'operative facts.'
91-5050
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jurisdiction over a claim praying for relief distinctly different
from that sought in a pending proceeding.18

III.
The Government presents several arguments why this case should
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Government argues first

that Loveladies' APA challenge to the validity of the permit denial
filed in district court,

and their suit in the Court of Federal

Claims for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment,

are in

reality one claim, arising from the same operative facts, and that
under the
§ 1500.

law

that

alone

is enough

to

bar

jurisdiction

under

As our precedents establish, and as we explained above,

a showing that the two claims arose from the same 'operative facts'
is necessary, but not sufficient, to preclude the Court of Federal
Claims from hearing a case.
§ 1500,

the

claims

must

To come within the proscription of

also

seek

the

same

relief.

Each

Loveladies' two suits prays for distinctly different relief.

of
The

Government's argument that § 1500 precludes the Court of Federal
Claims from hearing Loveladies'

takings claim on the ground of

operative facts alone is, under the law, without merit.19

Our independent search has turned up no such case.
At
oral argument counsel for both parties were asked if they knew of
any such case, and both answered in the negative.
19
Question 3 of the court's Order
asked in part, "If some but not all of the
same, does
J
o
h
n
s
M
a
v
i
le require that the
view of our disposition of the case, that
us for decision.
91-5050
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of September 28, 1993,
operative facts are the
§ 1500 bar apply?"
In
question is not before

The Government

then

argues

that we

should overturn

long

standing precedent and adopt new law, a new definition of "claims."
The Government argues that it should be enough to preclude the
Court of Federal Claims from hearing a claim if another claim,
arising from the same operative facts, is pending in another court,
regardless of the type of relief sought.
accept, as we have done

Under this theory, if we

arguendo, that Loveladies' two suits arise

from the same operative facts,20 then § 1500 denies jurisdiction to
the Court of Federal Claims.

The Government makes essentially two

arguments in support of a new understanding of § 1500.

Corona Coal Co.

First, the Government reads
U.S.

537

(1924),

to hold "the Supreme Court explicitly rejected

the concept that Section 154 (the
be

made

subject

irrelevant.

In

United States, 263

to

predecessor of § 1500]

a hardship

exception."

True

should

enough,

and

Corona Coal, the petitioner argued that even though

there was a pending suit in district court seeking the same relief
based on the same facts as those in the Court of Claims suit, the
statutory bar should not apply because the imminent running of the
statute of limitations
Court responded:

forced petitioner to file.

The Supreme

"But the words of the statute are plain, with

nothing in the context to make their meaning doubtful? no room is
left

for

exception
cases."

20
91-5050

construction,
in

order

to

and

we

remove

are

not

apparent

Id. at 540.

See note 17 supra.
15

at

liberty

hardship

in

to

add

an

particular

The case before us is not a matter in which a court-created
exception to an otherwise plain piece of legislation is at issue.
As we noted earlier,

Casman did not create an "exception” to the
British

rule of § 1500, any more than
this

court or

its predecessor

was

did.

called

upon

meaning of an ill-defined and multivalent term,

specify

"claims,"

the
in a

(i) identity of relief requested, and (ii)

identity of operative facts —
claims.

to

Casman and British American establish two

particular factual context.
applicable principles —

In each case,

with which to test the identity of

As we have seen, this court has consistently adhered to

those principles.
The

Government's

understanding

of

§ 1500

second
is

argument

that,

if

we

for
do

adopting
not

adopt

its
the

Government's view, we will return the law to the confused state it
was

in before

our

opinion

in

UNR, the opinion in which,

the

Government claims, we eliminated much prior case law interpreting
§ 1500 and thereby rectified
statute.

the jurisprudence

There are three problems with this argument.

discussed above, our opinion in

First, as

UNR did not make all the supposedly

crooked ways surrounding § 1500 straight.
work like that; that is its genius.
690 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1982)

The common law does not

See South Corp. v. United States,
("resolution of conflict, a

major element in this court's mission,

requires not a one-shot

selection but a careful, considered, cautious,
approach.").
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and contemplative

Second, the Government introduces no evidence of the alleged
confusion presumably surrounding § 1500.

We have not been shown

the existence of a serious shortcoming in the case law causing
irremediable difficulty for litigants.
and

The principles of

British American are not that difficult to comprehend or apply.

Third, whatever residue of confusion may exist in the Government's
mind on this issue, or in the minds of others, our opinion today
should dispel.
The Government finally argues that, even if § 1500 does not
bar the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims when different
relief

is

sought,

Loveladies

in

fact

was

not

different from that sought in the district court.

seeking

relief

The Government

bases this argument on a comparison of the complaints filed in
those

courts.

The

pleadings

are

in

some

respects

similar

(apparently parts were copied one from the other), and both ask the
court to "declare"

certain conclusions.

Government, this case is different from

Therefore,

Casman in that Loveladies

sought the same declaratory relief in both courts.
agrees with the Government.

argues the

The dissent

We do not.

The district court complaint alleges jurisdiction under both
the Fifth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
and under § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
(33 U.S.C.
§ 554),

§ 1344),

the Administrative

and

the

general

jurisdiction

over

federal

grant

to

questions,

reciting allegations as to all counts,

91-5050
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Procedure Act
the

28

district

U.S.C.

(5 U.S.C.
courts

§ 1331.

of

After

the complaint sets forth

eight numbered counts.

The gravamen of the First Count is the

allegation that "defendant has violated the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution by taking plaintiffs' private property
for public use without compensation."

The remaining counts allege

various wrongs in the regulatory authority and practices of the
Corps as they relate to the Loveladies case.

The complaint closes

with a prayer that asks the court for relief, including:
2. Declaring that the action of the defendant in denying
the permit application of plaintiffs constitutes a taking
of property in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution;
•

•

•

•

4. Declaring that the regulations relied upon ... are
unconstitutional [as beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause];
•

•

•

•

5. Declaring that the regulations relied upon

... are

ultra vires . . .
and concludes with the usual "granting such other relief

..."

prayer.
The complaint in the Court of Claims is similar, but shorter.
The jurisdictional allegations are limited to the Fifth Amendment,
and to § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act21 and 28
U.S.C.

§ 1494, the Tucker Act.

There are only two counts.

first is a repeat, somewhat expanded,
district court complaint.

of the first count of the

The second count repeats some of the

allegations about the arbitrary nature of the Corps' decision.
prayer again,

The

The

inter alia, includes a request for relief that the

court declare that the action of the defendant

in denying the

Both
1
2
the district court and Court of Claims complaints
contain the same typographical error -- they refer to the Federal
Water Pollution Contract Act.
91-5050

18

permit application of plaintiffs constitutes a taking of property
in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
It is important to note that the prayer in the Court of Claims
complaint contained an express request for damages.

Significantly,

that request was missing from the complaint in the district court.
Furthermore,

despite

asking

that

the

court

'declare'

relief,

neither complaint, in the jurisdictional allegations or elsewhere,
refers or cites to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
Nor

has

the

Government

pointed

to

anything

that

suggests

the

proceedings were conducted under that Act, or in accordance with
the rules that govern such proceedings.22

In each suit, the full

relief requested could have been granted by,

in the case of the

district court suit, a mandatory injunction, and in the case of the
Court of Federal Claims suit, a decree for money damages, without
either court "declaring” anything.

The use of the term "declaring"

in the prayers for relief was clearly intended to convey a request
different from a formal declaration under the Declaratory Judgment
Act.
The

Government

further

argues

that

the

presence

of

an

allegation of a taking in the two complaints means that the claims
in the district court suit were the same claims as those in the
Court

of

Federal

Claims

suit,

since

Loveladies

sought

in the

district court a declaration of taking and thus implicitly the

See
2 Fed. R. civ. P. 57.
91-5050
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But the

monetary relief that would accompany the declaration.23

Government itself destroyed the core of that argument in its answer
to that complaint.

In the district court, the Government stated

as its First Separate Defense:
jurisdiction
property."

over

the

"This Court lacks subject matter

Complaint's

allegations

of

a

taking

of

The district court agreed with the Government's view

that Count I was without legal significance as far as a taking and
compensation under the

Fifth Amendment

were

concerned.

While

granting judgment in favor of the Government on all other counts,
that court dismissed Count I without prejudice to the rights of
plaintiffs

to

pursue

Federal Claims.24

the takings

allegations

in

the

Court

of

The prayer for a "declaration" of a taking, for

which the First Count was the predicate, thus was equally without
legal significance.
By contrast, in the complaint in the Court of Federal Claims
Loveladies clearly alleged that a taking had occured, and that just
compensation was due them.
which

was

cited

by

As we have often noted, the Tucker Act,

Loveladies

as

their

jurisdictional

base,

provides jurisdiction for damage suits against the United States
Government,

but

a

recovery

against

the

Government

requires

a

substantive right created by some money-mandating constitutional§
*

We
3
2
note in passing that the allegations of a taking,
found in both complaints, could be viewed as reflecting the legal
theory assumed to underlie the factual allegations.
Since
differing legal theories do not define differing claims under
§ 1500, there seems no logical reason to suppose that overlapping
legal theories (see dissent, Slip
op.at 9)
same claims.
The
4
2
Government, as well as Loveladies, consented to the
dismissal.
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provision,

statute or regulation that has been violated,

express or implied contract with the United States.

United States v.

or an

See,

C
o
n
l
y,716 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1983)

cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1065 (1984).

(in

That Loveladies sought a clear

finding or "declaration" of their rights under the Fifth Amendment
as the money-mandating source of their entitlement to recovery
seems hardly surprising.
In sum, reading the two complaints in light of the legal and
factual circumstances in which they were drawn leaves little doubt
what was intended by the prayers for relief contained in them.

At

the time Loveladies filed their complaint in the district court
seeking invalidation of the Government's action, they may not have
foreseen the possible complications that might arise if they later
sought monetary relief in the Court of Federal Claims.
had,

perhaps

precision.

they might have

If they

framed their pleadings with more

Be that as it may, the claims in the two courts are for

distinctly different and not the same or even overlapping relief - this case presents the straightforward issue of plaintiffs "who
seek distinctly different types of relief

in the

two courts."

UNR/Keene, 113 S. ct. at 2044-45.25

25
The dissent invokes the overruling of Brown v. United States,
358 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1966), by this court in
and the Supreme
Court's agreement in UNR/Keene as somehow relevant to the overlapping
relief issue.
But Brown was a case in which, despite § 1500, the
Court of Claims had allowed a suit to proceed that was filed in
that court while a district court action seeking the same relief
was pending.
The reasoning in Brown was in direct conflict with
this court's and the Supreme Court's view of § 1500 as applied to
such cases, and obviously was not good law.
The facts of Brown
remove it from any application to the issues in this case.
91-5050
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IV.

The result we reach on the Government's motion
supported by the Supreme Court's decision in

v. United States, 363 U.S. 202 (1960).
confronted the

basic

issue here:

is further

Pennsylvania Railroad Co.

In that case the Supreme Court
the

interplay of two

legally

recognized and protected rights, which, because of the statutory
jurisdictional structure, are thrown into apparent conflict.
problem arose there,
agency exercised

its

The

as it does here, when a federal government
regulatory power

in a manner that

raises

questions both of the validity of the exercise and, if valid, the
economic consequences of the exercise.
In

Pennsylvania Railroad, war

conditions

had

prevented

the

Government's planned exportation of certain raw materials to Great
Britain.

The

Pennsylvania Railroad charged the Government the

higher 'domestic' rate for transport of the materials (the railroad
charged less for transport of goods for export).

The Government

paid the higher domestic rate, but then set-off the amount of the
price difference from other obligations it owed to the railroad.
The railroad brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover the
amount so deducted.

Id. at 203.

The Court of Claims proceedings initially were suspended while
the railroad and the Government disputed before the Interstate
Commerce

Commission

regulations
jurisdiction.

of

the
The

(ICC)
rates,
railroad

the
an

correctness
issue

disagreed

under

which
with

was

part

governing
under

of the

ICC
ICC's

determination, and appealed to the District Court as the statute
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provided, seeking to set aside the ICC order.

Plaintiff railroad

requested that the Court of Claims continue to stay its proceedings
pending

the

District

determination.

Court

ruling

on the validity

of the

ICC

The Court of Claims declined to do so. Id. at 203-

04.26
The Supreme Court held that this was error:
[J u
] risdiction [to review the ICC determination] is vested
exclusively in the District Courts. . . .
It necessarily
follows, of course, that since the Railroad had a right to have
the Commission's order reviewed, and only the District Court had
the jurisdiction to review it, the Court of
was under a duty

to stay its proceedings pending this review.
Id. at 205-06 (emphasis added).
The plaintiff in

Pennsylvania Railroad had a right to have the

Commission's order reviewed because it determined certain rights
and obligations which had significant legal consequences for its
dispute with the Government.

Plaintiffs such as Loveladies, too,

have a right to have the Corps' permit denial reviewed, without
being placed in the position of having to give up a substantial
legal right protected by the Takings Clause of the Constitution.

See also Aulston v. United States, 823 F.2d 510, 514 (Fed. cir. 1987)
(Claims Court ordered to "hold appellants'

taking claim on its

docket in suspension for such time as is reasonably necessary for

26
The Government sought also to dismiss the Court of Claims
action, citing § 1500. The Court of Claims denied the motion, and
the Supreme Court specifically noted that the issue was not
challenged on appeal.
Id. at 204. If jurisdiction as defined by
§ 1500 were at issue, the Supreme Court's indifference to the
question of its jurisdiction would be puzzling since it is a basic
principle that courts must attend to their jurisdiction even if the
parties do not.
Louisville & Nat'l R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149,
152 (1908); UNR, 962 F.2d at 1022.
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appellants to challenge the [agency] decision in a district court,
and if successful there, to return promptly to the Claims Court.").
The

plaintiff

Pennsylvania Railroad,

in

after

filing

in the

Claims Court, was confronted with the necessity of litigating the
regulatory

issue

in

another

court.

In

the

case

before

us,

plaintiffs filed the APA action in the district court first, and
then filed the takings claim in the Court of Federal Claims.
a takings case this is entirely logical —

In

if the validity of the

regulatory imposition is to be challenged, it makes sense to pursue
the validity question first so as to determine the necessity for
prosecuting the takings claim.

The risk of course is that too long

a time may be required for initiation of a suit,
other

pretrial

activities,

appellate levels.

and

decisions

at

discovery and

both

trial

and

It may not always be possible because of the

statute of limitations for a plaintiff to wait for the regulatory
challenge case to be finally concluded before filing in the Court
of Federal Claims.27
Litigation

can

particular interests

serve

public

interests

of the parties.

as

The nation

well

as

the

is served by

private litigation which accomplishes public ends, for example, by
checking the power of the Government through suits brought under
the

APA

or

under

the

takings

clause

of

the

Fifth

Amendment.

Because this nation relies in significant degree on litigation to
control the excesses to which Government may from time to time be
prone, it would not be sound policy to force plaintiffs to forego

28 U.S.C. § 2501 (Supp. IV 1992) sets the bar at 6 years.
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monetary claims in order to challenge the validity of Government
action,

or to preclude challenges to the validity of Government

action in order to protect a Constitutional claim for compensation.
Section 1500 was enacted to preclude duplicate cotton claims —
claims for money damages —
did

not

provide

the

Government

remains

in

with

judicata principles

protection

against

UNR/Keene, 113 S. Ct. at 2039.

"duplicative lawsuits."
viability

at a time when res

§

1500,

absent

a

clear

such

Whatever

expression

of

Congressional intent we ought not extend the statute to allow the
Government to foreclose non-duplicative suits, and to deny remedies
the Constitution and statutes otherwise provide.

CONCLUSION
The motion of the Government that the judgment of the Court
of Federal Claims be vacated and the complaint dismissed is denied.
The case is returned to the panel for decision on the merits.

MOTION DENIED.
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LOVELADIES HARBOR, INC. and
LOVELADIES HARBOR, UNIT D, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellees,
v.
THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellant.
MAYER, Circuit Judge, with whom NIES* and RADER, Circuit Judges,
join, dissenting.
♦

Because I see no reason to reconsider our recent

in banc

decision in UNR v. United States. 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
aff'd sub nom. Keene Coro, v. United States. 508 U.S. __, 113
S. Ct. 2035 (1993), I dissent.
I.
A court is free to reverse itself when it sits in banc, of
course,

but

demands

special

undertaking.

"any departure

justification,"

which

of stare decisis

is missing

from today's

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 491 U.S. 164, 172

(1989) (citation omitted)).
statutory

from the doctrine

interpretation,

This is especially so "in the area of
for

here,

unlike

in

the

context

of

Circuit
*
Judge Nies vacated the position of Chief Judge
on March 17, 1994.

constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated,
and Congress remains free to alter what we have done."
This

case

revolves

around

the

authority

of

the

Id.
Court

of

Federal Claims to hear petitioners who have a suit against the
government relating to the same claims pending in another court.
28 U.S.C.

§ 1500

(Supp. IV 1992).1

Like all federal courts, the

Court of Federal Claims has limited jurisdiction, with a range of
authority extending only so far as Congress, by statute, permits;
the statutes that define the court's jurisdiction must be strictly
construed.
injustice

Keene, 113

S.

Ct.

at 2040.

in a particular case,

justice or equity,
narrow bounds.

Though this may work

we cannot,

in the

interest of

presume to expand jurisdiction beyond these

Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486

U.S. 800, 818 (1988).
In UNR we addressed the meaning of "claim" under section 1500.
962 F.2d at 1023.

The claims heard by the Court of Federal Claims

generally involve requests for monetary relief.

But it does not

follow that only suits brought in other courts for money damages
can give rise to section 1500's jurisdictional bar.

Section 1500

divests the Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction over such a
claim where the plaintiff has a suit

for the claim pending in

another court or where the one in the Court of Federal Claims
1

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall
not have jurisdiction of any claims for or in
respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee
has pending in any other court any suit or
process against the United States . . . .

Id.
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relates

to

—
-

is

"in

respect

to"

—

another

suit.

The

jurisdictional question raised by section 1500 is thus not simply
whether

the

claims

are

the

"same,"

sufficiently related to invoke the bar.

but

whether

they

are

In UNR. the in banc court

reaffirmed that the answer lies in a comparison of the operative
facts from which the suits arise.

"[C]orrectly construed, section

1500 applies to all claims on whatever theories that 'arise from
the same operative facts.'" 962 F.2d at 1023 (citation omitted).
UNR

was

"a

comprehensive

effort

to

set

out

the

proper

interpretation of a jurisdictional statute, a matter that does not
require a pointed dispute between parties.

Courts are obliged to

resolve jurisdictional questions on their own even if parties do
not raise them.

In the course of this interpretive effort,

if

prior cases are seen as inconsistent, it is incumbent on the court
to acknowledge their nonviability."

962 F.2d at 1023.

At issue

were the indemnification claims of corporations who manufactured
and supplied asbestos products in the course of contract work for
the government.
the

When workers filed personal injury suits against

corporations

arising

from exposure

to their products,

the

defendants sought indemnification from the government in district
court, alleging tort theories, and in the Court of Federal Claims
on contractual theories.
We

confirmed

the

trial

court's

dismissal

of

the

claims,

holding that section 1500 applied regardless of which action was
first filed, and that "claim", as it appears in the statute, refers
not to the legal theory of the suit but to the operative facts
91-5050

3

supporting the petitioners' various actions.

Thus, we held that

the petitioners' claims in the Court of Federal Claims were claims
for or in respect to which they had suits pending in the district
court, even though the former were based on contractual theories
of recovery and the latter on tort theories,
from the same personal injuries.

because they arose

Id. at 1023.

We also considered the exception to this
Casman v.

United States. 135 Ct.

adherence

to

section

1500

different forms of relief.

where

Cl.
the

647

rule set out in

(1956),

claims

in

which excused
question

seek

We all knew a factual predicate for a

Casman exception was not before us in U N R . but during the course
of our consideration of the statute, it was plain that we could not
square

that

and

like

jurisdictional statute.

cases

with

the

clear

meaning

of

the

That statute, as a whole, was before us

in UNR; there is no requirement that a factual predicate underlay
every jot and tittle of it before a court can explain what it
means.
The history of section 1500 is replete with instances where
courts sought to temper perceived inequity by inventing exceptions
to the rule.

See 962 F.2d at 1020.

In Casman. the injustice was

thought to arise because no court was able to simultaneously grant
complete relief to the petitioner:

he sought restoration to his

position, available only in the district court, and back pay, which
he could only recover in the Court of Claims.
1500

inapplicable

because

it was

thought

plaintiff to choose between the two courts.
91-5050
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Casman held section
unfair

to

force the

135 Ct. Cl. at 650.

But

it

is

axiomatic

that

courts

jurisdiction in the interest of equity.
818.

cannot

extend

their

Christianson. 486 U.S. at

Faced with a jurisdictional statute riddled with judicially

created loopholes, in UNR we concluded that section 1500 should be
applied according to its plain words, and that instrumental to such
application was a single, coherent definition of the word "claim"
as referring only to the facts underlying the petitioner's action
against

the

government.

This

construction

is consistent with

precedent stretching back sixty years or more.

UNR. 962 F.2d at

1023; Johns-Manville Coro, v. United States. 855 F.2d 1556,

1563

(Fed. Cir. 1988)? British American Tobacco Co. v. United States.
89 Ct. Cl. 438, 440 (1939).2 We overruled Casman because it was in
conflict with this interpretation.
The Supreme Court agreed that "the comparison of the two cases
for

purposes

plaintiff's

of

possible

other

suit

dismissal
was

based

would
on

turn

on whether

substantially

the

the
same

operative facts as the Court of Claims action, at least if there
was some overlap in the relief requested."

113 S. Ct. at 2042.

Finding that the Casman exception was not implicated by the facts
of the case before it, the Court chose not to decide whether two
actions seeking different relief would require dismissal under the

2
The court tells us that we have always applied sectio
1500 pursuant to a two pronged test, operative facts and relief
requested.
But there is no evidence of this before the Casman
departure in 1956, a period of some 88 years after the statute was
enacted.
We did not notice this phenomenon in our UNR exercise,
and the Supreme Court apparently missed it in Keene. as well. See
113 S. Ct. at 2043.
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statute.

I d . at 2043

n.6.

The Court said nothing by way of

disapproval of our ruling on Casman.
hearing

that

case

here

said

But nine of the ten judges

that

inconsistent with section 1500.

Casman

was

unsound and

One wonders why six of them now

think otherwise.
Be

that

as

it may,

now,

only

one

year

later,

the

court

resurrects Casman, scrambling once more down the path of judicial
revision of the statute.

Normally,

"[i]n cases where statutory

precedents have been overruled, the primary reason for the Court's
shift in position has been the intervening development of the law,
through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action
taken by Congress."
no

laws

have

Patterson. 491 U.S. at 173.

changed

in the

short time

since

To my knowledge,
we

decided UNR.

Departing from stare decisis demands more than cursory distinctions
—

at the very least, one would expect reversal of our so recent

in banc precedent to be supported by some compelling reason.
"[A] traditional justification for overruling a prior case is
that a precedent may be a positive detriment to coherence and
consistency in the law . . . ."

Id.

This was the justification

which supported the overruling of Casman in UNR.

We said there

that section 1500, which had become a judicial embarrassment,
monument

to

cynicism,

"is

now

so

riddled

with

a

unsupportable

loopholes that it has lost its predictability and people cannot
rely on it to order their affairs."

962 F.2d at 1021.

In fact,

only the other day we unanimously agreed that "fail[ure] to adhere
to a statutory mandate over an extended period of time does not
91-5050
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justify . . . continuing to do so."
1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994)

In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189,

(in banc).

I agree that plaintiffs should have access to the full range
of remedies which the Constitution and statutes provide, especially
in light of the important public interest in controlling government
excesses.

Indeed, the claims of these property owners might well

be valid on the merits, if only it were appropriate to reach them.
When

the

government

compensation.

takes

private

property

it

must

pay

just

But Congress set out just how such plaintiffs may

bring their suits; we have no right to second guess in the absence
of congressional transgression of the Constitution.
It cannot seriously be doubted that Congress has the power to
order that the government need not defend claims arising from the
same operative facts simultaneously in several
commonly based suit
necessarily

forever

forums.

That a

is pending in the district court does not
divest

the

Court

of

Federal

Claims

of

jurisdiction over a claim; section 1500 decrees only that a party
cannot maintain actions in both courts at the same time.

It may

sometimes happen that the district court challenge is not finished
within six years, after which any Court of Federal Claims action
would be barred.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).

But

statutes limiting courts' jurisdiction will always work injustice
in particular cases.

Christianson. 486 U.S.

Keene. 113 S. Ct. at 2045.

at 818.

See also

This is not such a case, however, for

Loveladies' district court action,

including its appeal to the

Court of Appeals for the Third circuit, was resolved within three
91-5050

7

years.

See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. Baldwin. Civ. No. 82-1948

(D.N.J.

March

12,

1984),

aff'd

751

F.2d

376

(3d

Cir.

1984).

Loveladies still would have had three years in which to file its
claim in the Court of Federal Claims for compensation after the
resolution of its challenge to the permit denial.
As we said in UNR, "[i]t may have seemed unfair ’to deprive
plaintiffs of the only forum they
demand,'

[had]

in which to test their

but that does not justify rewriting the statute."

F.2d at 1022 (citation omitted).

962

"Our individual appraisal of the

wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by
the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a
statute.

Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its

constitutionality determined,
end."

TVA v.

Hill. 437 U.S.

the
153,

judicial
194

process

(1977).3

comes

to an

In Keene, the

Supreme Court suggested that efforts to reform section 1500 should

In
3

words worthy of our consideration,
the Court
continued:
"The lines ascribed to Sir Thomas More by Robert Bolt
are not without relevance here:
The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's
right.
And I'll stick to what's legal. . . . I'm not
God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which
you find such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no
voyager.
But in the thickets of the law, oh there I'm
a forester. . . . What would you do? Cut a great road
through the law to get after the Devil? . . . And when
the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you
— where would you hide, Roper, the laws being flat?
. . . This country's planted thick with laws from coast
to coast — Man's laws, not God's —
- and if you cut them
down . . . d'you really think you could stand upright in
the winds that would blow them? . . . Yes, I'd give the
Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.
437 U.S. at 195 (quoting R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, Act I,
p. 147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed. 1967)).
91-5050
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be addressed to Congress.

113 S. Ct. at 2045.

of UNR. and I still think so.
been introduced.

That was the point

In fact, a bill to do just that has

S. 1355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.

(1993).

II.
Finally,

the

court's

resurrection

supported by the facts of this case.

of

Casman

is

not

even

The government argues that

in both the district court and the Court of Federal Claims the
complaints

sought

defendant

in

relief

denying

" [d]eclaring

the

permit

that

the

application

action
of

of

the

plaintiffs

constitutes a taking of property in violation of plaintiffs' rights
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution."
is

sufficient

overlapping

relief

to make

the

question

This

one

of

operative facts alone, even under this court's imaginative reading
of Keene.

See 113 S. Ct. at 2043 (relying on operative facts when

there is "some overlap in the relief requested").
The court elides this argument by saying that we should ignore
the words of the complaints —
declaration of a taking —

language expressly requesting a

and substitute instead its understanding

of what Loveladies must have intended by the several suits.

It

concludes that Loveladies did not seek overlapping relief because
it must not have intended to request a "formal" declaration under
the

Declaratory

Judgment

Act,

28

U.S.C.

§ 2201

(1988).

For

support, the court notes that Loveladies also requested damages in
the Court of Federal
district court.

91-5050
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to the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the lack of any evidence that
the proceedings were conducted according to the rules governing
proceedings under that act.

Finally,

the court points out that

Loveladies had adequate remedies in both the district court and the
Court of Federal Claims without either court declaring anything.
From this, it supposes that Loveladies could not really have been
requesting declaratory relief at all.
But declaratory relief is not some special, exclusive remedy;
it is an additional form of relief, readily available even when it
would be cumulative of other requested relief.

28 U.S.C. § 2201

(allowing declaration of rights "whether or not further relief is
or could be sought") ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 ("The existence of another
adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief
. . . .").

It is simply irrelevant that Loveladies asked

for

monetary relief in one forum and not in the other, and that either
court could grant adequate relief aside from any declaration.
Nor is

it surprising that Loveladies did not rely on the

Declaratory Judgment Act as a basis for jurisdiction, since that
act is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction.
Oil

Co.

v.

Phillips

Speedco, Inc. v.

Petroleum Co., 339

Estes, 853

F.2d

909,

U.S.
911

667,
(Fed.

Skellv

671

(1950);

Cir.

1988).

Indeed, there is no special set of procedures governing declaratory
judgment actions; they are controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Fed.

R. Civ.

P. 57.

Under those rules,

Loveladies

needed only to state facts adequate to support its request for
relief; no ritualistic citation to the Declaratory Judgment Act
was necessary.
91-5050
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That
ignore

said,

the court's position reduces

Loveladies'

request

for

overlapping

to a decision to
relief

because

it

resulted from imprecise pleading, a mere oversight that we should
excuse since the district court had no jurisdiction to address the
takings allegation.

But it makes no difference under section 1500

whether there is subject matter jurisdiction in the district court,
or not.

See Frantz Equipment Co. v. United States. 98 F. Supp.

579,

(Ct. Cl.

580

1951)

("The applicability of Sec.

1500 to the

first claim of plaintiff, asserted in its petition herein, is not
conditioned upon the question of whether the District Court had
jurisdiction
. . . .").

of

the

claim

asserted

by

the

plaintiff

therein

All that matters even under the court's new rule is

that Loveladies had a suit pending in the district court seeking
relief overlapping that requested in the Court of Federal Claims.
That the district court ultimately dismissed the first count is
irrelevant; it was pending when Loveladies filed suit in the Court
of Federal Claims, so section 1500 applies.
The result of the court's machinations is to revive Brown v.
United States. 358 F.2d 1002,

1005

(Ct. Cl.

1966),

which said,

"Section 1500 was not intended to compel claimants to elect, at
their peril, between prosecuting their claim in this court (with
conceded jurisdiction,

aside

from Section 1500)

tribunal which is without jurisdiction."

and

in another

But we overruled Brown

in UNR, 962 F.2d at 1022, and in Keene the Supreme Court expressly
agreed, 113 S. Ct. at 2045 & n.12.
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